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Abstract
We analyze the incentives for cost-reducing R&D by downstream
firms in a two-tier market structure. Downstream R&D increases the
demand for an input, thereby allowing the upstream firm to raise the
input price. While it lowers the benefit of R&D to a downstream
firm, such a price adjustment by the input supplier leads to a higher
production cost for all rival firms. Due to this “raising rivals’ cost”
effect, a downstream oligopolist may invest more in R&D than does
a downstream monopolist, a phenomenon that does not occur in a
purely horizontal setting. Fixed-price agreements under which the
input price remains unchanged in response to downstream R&D pro-
mote innovation by eliminating the opportunistic behavior of the input
supplier. In general, the incentive for downstream R&D is positively
related to input pricing rigidity
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JEL Numbers: L13, L22, O31
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1 Introduction
There is by now a huge body of literature dealing with various aspects of
innovative R&D1 with much attention focused on horizontal R&D in indus-
tries where firms are competitors on the product market. In this paper we
extend our understanding of horizontal R&D by considering innovations in
vertically related industries.
In markets that involve two tiers of producers such as upstream input sup-
pliers and downstream manufacturers, innovations by downstream producers
inevitably affect upstream suppliers. For example, cost-reducing R&D by au-
tomobile makers enable them to lower prices and sell more cars, which leads
to the increased purchase of auto parts. Innovative activities by a computer
retailer like Dell brings benefits to suppliers of components (such as chips)
and complementary products (such as software), in addition to themselves.
It is obvious that innovations by downstream producers will lead to increased
demand for the inputs they use in their production, which is beneficial to the
input suppliers.2 Taking this as our point of departure, we study how this
affects the R&D incentive of downstream producers.
We find that the increased demand for the input may allow suppliers to
increase the input price while selling more of the input. We derive conditions
under which this price increase takes place for general demand functions
for the final product: essentially, cost-reduction downstream must make the
derived demand curve for the input steeper. We then show that this price
increase has two opposing effects on the R&D incentive of a downstream
producer. While the higher input price offsets some of the cost reduction
of the downstream firm from the R&D (a negative incentive effect), the
1See Reinganum (1989) for a detailed survey.
2See Lee (1996) for an analysis of this demand-pull effect of the investment by Japanese
machine tools users on the tool suppliers.
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increase in input price applies to all the other downstream firms as well.
Therefore the R&D by the downstream firm indirectly raises the production
cost of its competitors (a positive incentive effect). We show that due to
this raising rivals’ cost (RRC) effect, downstream firms may have a stronger
incentive to do R&D when the degree of downstream competition is low. In
particular, we show that downstream oligopolists each invest more in R&D
than a downstream monopoly, provided the number of firms is not too large
(fewer than 6 in the case of linear demand). Of course such a scenario could
never arise in standard horizontal R&D settings.
The tendency for the upstream suppliers to raise the input price after the
downstream producers have conducted their R&D can be viewed as a type
of opportunistic behavior on the part of the suppliers. One way to overcome
this negative incentive effect is for the suppliers and the manufacturers to
sign a fixed input price contract. Under this type of contract, the suppliers
agree not to change the input price in response to downstream R&D, a kind
of long-term input price agreement. We show that while this type of contract
eliminates the RRC incentive for R&D, the net effect is that firms are more
innovative than under the floating price arrangement. Our results shed light
on why vertically related firms may often engage in long term contractual
relationships regardless of other considerations.
To highlight the positive relationship between input pricing rigidity and
the incentive for downstream R&D, as well as to isolate the RRC effect,
we consider the case where the input supplier is able to price discriminate
among downstream producers. We show that such increased flexibility in
input pricing by the upstream supplier further hinders the downstream R&D
incentive for R&D, relative to the uniform but floating price arrangement.
Under price discrimination, the monopoly supplier can raise the input price
for an innovating downstream producer without having to raise the prices
of its other rival firms. Therefore, the RRC effect is absent under price
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discrimination and consequently, the equilibrium R&D level is lower than
under uniform pricing.
Our paper is related to several branches of the industrial organization
literature. First, it contributes to the literature on horizontal R&D which
has received a great deal of attention in the past two decades. This strand
typically examines the R&D incentives of firms competing in the product
market, abstracting from the upstream suppliers of inputs. In such a pure
horizontal R&D set-up, a firm’s cost-reducing investment enables it to steal
market share from its rivals without affecting their cost structures. The main
questions addressed here have included the impact of the degree of product
market competition on firm R&D incentives, the effect of R&D cooperation,
the implication of R&D spillovers, and the design of public policy to best
induce welfare improving innovative activities by private firms. One of the
well-understood results in this literature is that (for non-drastic innovations)
firms’ R&D investment levels decline as the number of competitors increase
because increased competition erodes the return to innovation. Our paper
is among the first to extend the R&D literature into a vertical setting by
focusing on the effect of a firm’s R&D investment on its rivals channelled
through the reactions of an upstream supplier. Our analysis identifies the
RRC effect of R&D because of which a downstream duopolist invests more
in R&D than does a downstream monopoly.
Secondly, the general idea of a firm obtaining a competitive advantage
through strategic actions that can raise rivals’ costs is not new in the indus-
trial organization literature. For example, Salop and Scheffman (1983) argue
that a firm can raise the costs of production of its rivals by means of in-
ducing supplier group boycotts, promoting industry-wide labor unionization,
lobbying for more government regulations, and so on. In models of vertical
integration and foreclosure, Salinger (1988) and Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(1990) show that a downstream firm may strategically acquire an input sup-
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plier with the purpose of reducing upstream competition and hence raising
the input price for its downstream competitors. In this paper we show that
an RRC effect also exists when downstream firms engage in cost-reducing
R&D, where the effect is channelled through the increased demand for the
input resulting from downstream R&D.
Our paper is also related to the study of investment incentives of firms
in the bilateral ‘hold-up’ problem.3 One fundamental insight from this line
of research is that in the presence of asset specificity, firms who are about
to form a bilateral partnership tend to underinvest as each fears the possible
post-investment exploitation by the other party. Two ways to overcome such
“opportunistic behavior” are for the parties to form a single firm (through
vertical integration, for example) or to contract through a third party. Our
analysis of fixed-price contracting is very much in the same spirit of mitigat-
ing the “opportunistic behavior” of the upstream firm.
Fixed-price arrangements in the context of R&D have received some at-
tention recently from McLaren (1999) who contrasts them with informal
agreements (“handshakes”) between upstream suppliers and downstream cus-
tomers. He shows that fixed price contracting encourages autonomous inno-
vation by the upstream supplier, but handshake arrangements are better for
promoting joint innovation by both the supplier and the customer. Our focus
however is different: we look exclusively at downstream R&D and consider
the role of fixed-price contracts in mitigating the RRC effect.4
Finally, some recent studies on R&D incorporate a two-tier structure
but focus on research questions that are different from ours. Steurs (1995)
and Inkmann (1999) extended the horizontal R&D literature by adding an
3See Williamson (1975) and Klein (1988), for example.
4The RRC effect is absent in McLaren’s model because the output of each downstream
producer is normalized to unity so that the demand for the input is independent of down-
stream research investment.
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upstream market into the model of d’Asprémont and Jacquemin (1988) and
explore the effects of intra- and inter-industry spillovers. Stefanadis (1997)
analyzes the relationship of upstream R&D and vertical foreclosure, and
shows that an upstream supplier has an incentive to “capture” a downstream
user in order to reduce the customer base for another upstream firm’s R&D.
In a model of vertical research joint ventures (VRJVs), Banerjee and Lin
(2001) look at the incentives of upstream and downstream firms in forming
VRJVs and examine the equilibrium VRJV size under different cost-sharing
rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we look at
general demand and derive the sufficient condition for downstream R&D to
increase the input price charged by the upstream supplier. In Section 3, we
analyze the RRC effect of R&D in the linear demand set-up and show how
the RRC effect and the equilibrium R&D investment vary with the number
of firms. Section 4 shows that a fixed-price contract can serve as a means
of mitigating the opportunistic behavior of upstream suppliers and thus pro-
mote downstream R&D. Section 5 considers differential pricing contracts and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Sufficient Conditions for Raising the Input
Price
Consider a two-tier industry with one upstream firm, U , and n downstream
firms indexed by Dj, j = 1, ..., n. The upstream firm supplies an intermediate
good to the downstream firms whose output of the final product is {qj}.
The cost of production for the upstream firm is normalized to zero. The
final good is produced with a fixed-coefficient technology (one unit of final
product requiring exactly one unit of the input), with the marginal cost of
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transforming the intermediate good into the final good being cj. Let w be
the price of the intermediate good. Thus, the marginal cost of producing the
final good for downstream firm Dj is w+cj. The inverse demand for the final
good is given by p = p(Q) where p′ < 0 and Q =
∑n
j=1 qj. The downstream
firms compete in Cournot fashion in the market for the final product.
Given the input price w set by the upstream supplier, firm Dj maximizes
p(Q)qj − (w + cj)qj.
The first order condition is





j . The second order sufficient condition for a maximum
is 2p′(Q∗) + p′′(Q∗)q∗j < 0. The system of equations in (1) determine the
Cournot equilibrium output levels in the downstream market. Summing up
these first order conditions over all j we get




which implicitly defines the derived demand for the input Q∗ = Q∗(w, c1, . . . , cn).










(n + 1)p′ + p′′(·)Q∗ < 0,
(3)
where the sign follows from summing across the second order conditions for
all n downstream firms. Since ∂Q
∗
∂cj
< 0, it implies that cost-reducing R&D
by any downstream firm raises the demand for the input.
The upstream firm then maximizes its profit w·Q∗(w, c1, . . . , cn) by choos-






Equation (4) implicitly defines the equilibrium input price w∗ = w∗(c1, ..., cn).
To see the impact of downstream R&D on the equilibrium input price, we


















The denominator is positive by the second order condition of U ’s maximiza-
tion problem. Since ∂Q
∗
∂cj











(n + 2)p′′(·) + p′′′(·)Q∗






which is non-positive if (n + 2)p′′(·) + p′′′(·)Q ≤ 0 at Q∗. Therefore, we have
the following result.
Proposition 1 For general demand function p(Q) with p′ < 0, a reduction
in a downstream firm’s marginal cost will cause the input price to go up if
(n+2)p′′+p′′′Q ≤ 0 at the equilibrium Cournot quantity Q∗(w∗, c1, c2, . . . , cn).
The condition that ∂
2Q
∂w∂cj
is non-positive simply says that downstream
R&D makes the derived demand steeper. Note that this condition holds in
the special case of linear demand p = a − Q since p′′ = p′′′ = 0.
It is useful to contrast our vertical two-tier market structure with the
standard one-tier horizontal R&D setting. In the latter, a firm’s cost-reducing
R&D investment serves the sole purpose of increasing its cost advantage over
its rivals by lowering its cost of production. In our model, however, R&D by
a downstream firm has an additional “strategic effect” on its competitors:
downstream R&D by increasing the demand for the intermediate good could
result in a higher input price for all the downstream firms. Although the
increased input price partially offsets the cost-reduction of the firm that
8
does R&D, it also provides this firm with a new incentive for downstream
R&D, namely to raise its rivals’ costs, an effect which is absent in standard
horizontal settings. Thus R&D by a downstream producer not only confers
on it a cost advantage relative to its rivals, but it additionally raises its rivals’
absolute cost through the input price adjustments in the upstream market.
In the next section, we explore this raising rivals’ cost (RRC) effect when the
demand for the final product is linear to see how this affects a downstream
firm’s incentive for R&D.
3 Raising Rivals’ Cost Incentive for R&D:
The Case of Linear Demand
Suppose the inverse demand for the final good is linear: p = a − Q, a >
0. The marginal cost of transforming the input good into the final good
for firm Dj is c − yj, where yj is the cost-reduction as a result of R&D
undertaken by firm Dj. For simplicity, assume that the R&D cost is given
by γy2j . Throughout the paper, it is assumed that γ ≥ 1 so that the R&D
cost function is convex enough to guarantee the validity of the second order
conditions for R&D maximization problems. As in the previous section,
the downstream firms make R&D decisions simultaneously. Then the input
supplier sets the price of the input and the downstream firms compete in the
market for the final product. We solve the equilibrium R&D investment using
the standard backward induction procedure. In this simple set-up, we will
be able to see clearly how the RRC effect influences firms’ R&D decisions.
Given their R&D decisions and the price of the input, w, the downstream
firms compete in Cournot fashion, resulting in an output level of
qj =





















The upstream firm simply sets the input price at the monopoly level
w∗ =
a − c + ∑ yj/n
2
. (7)
Substituting this into the inverse demand function for the input, we get the
equilibrium aggregate output
Q∗ =
n (a − c + ∑ yj/n)
2(n + 1)
. (8)
Before proceeding further, it is useful now to note that firm Dj’s overall
marginal cost is
w∗ + c − yj =






∂(w∗ + c − yj)
∂yj
= −2n − 1
2n
and





for k = j,
a result summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 A unit reduction in firm Dj’s marginal transformation cost de-
creases its overall marginal cost by 1− 1
2n
and raises each rival firm’s overall
marginal cost by 1
2n
.
Lemma 1 indicates the existence of the RRC effect and how this effect
depends on the degree of downstream competition. As n rises, each individual
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downstream firm becomes smaller relative to the industry (its Cournot output
declines). So a drop in its unit cost will not shift the demand for the input as
much. Thus, the increase in the input price is smaller, resulting in a weaker
RRC effect on its rival firms.






(a − c) + 2
{









πDj = [a −
∑
qk − (w∗ + c − yj)]qj = (qj)2.
At the R&D stage, each downstream firm chooses yj to maximize π
D
j −γy2j .
Solving the first order condition and imposing the symmetry condition yj =
y∗, we obtain the equilibrium R&D level for each downstream firm5
y∗(n) =
a − c
γH(n) − 1 ,
where
H(n) ≡ 4(n + 1)
2n
2n2 − 1 .
To illustrate the RRC effect on firm incentive to conduct R&D, compare the
case of a successive monopoly (n = 1) with that of a downstream duopoly
(n = 2). We have
y∗(1) =
a − c





γ − 1 .
Therefore, y∗(2) > y∗(1); a downstream duopolist invests more in R&D than





y∗(3) < y∗(2). It can be easily shown that y∗(n) further decreases with n for
all n ≥ 3 and that the following result holds.
5The second order condition for the R&D maximization problem is (2n
2−1)2
4n2(n+1)2 ≤ γ. Since
the lefthand side is always less than 1, the assumed condition γ ≥ 1 is sufficient to fulfill
this requirement.
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Proposition 2 If γ ≥ 1, then y∗(n) increases as n goes from 1 to 2 and
then decreases with n > 2. In particular, y∗(n) > y∗(1) for n < 6.
Proof . Ignoring that n is an integer, H ′(n) has the same sign as 2n3 −
2n2 − 3n − 1, which is positive if and only if is n ≥ 2. The second part of
the proposition can be proven by noting that y∗(n) > y∗(1) if and only if
H(n) < 16. This latter inequality is equivalent to n3−6n2 +n+4 < 0, which
holds if and only if n < 6.
Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. An increase in n impacts
R&D in two ways. First, increased competition in the final product market
reduces the output for each downstream firm and erodes its profits, which
tends to reduce their incentive for cost-reducing R&D. This effect leads to a
monotonic decline of equilibrium R&D with the number of producers in the
usual horizontal setting.6 In our two-tier model however, there is a second
and opposing factor, the RRC effect which is unique to a vertical setting, that
promotes the initial increase of equilibrium R&D as we go from a downstream
monopoly (where the RRC effect is absent) to a downstream duopoly. Indeed,
the RRC incentive for downstream R&D is quite strong: compared to the
case of downstream monopoly, downstream oligopolists invest more in R&D
than a monopolist as long as n < 6.
At the symmetric equilibrium, the profit of each downstream firm net of
R&D cost is
πDj − γ(y∗)2 =













6See d’Asprémont and Jacquemin (1988), and Suzumura (1992) for example.
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Noting (8), the profit of the upstream supplier is,








Although ex post it is optimal for the upstream firms to raise the input
price after the downstream firms have completed their R&D projects, such a
price adjustment obviously hurts the R&D incentive of the downtream firms.
Since reduced downstream R&D means lowered demand for the input, it is in
the interest of the upstream suppliers ex ante to find ways to alleviate or to
eliminate the ‘opportunistic behavior’ of raising the input price. Suppose the
firms can write a contract wherein the input price cannot be changed after
R&D, i.e., the input price is chosen before R&D is undertaken and stays fixed
thereafter. This type of arrangement can be viewed as a long-term contrac-
tual relationship whereby the upstream and the downstream firms commit
to a prespecified input price even if the downstream firms increase the quan-
tity of the input purchased from the supplier. In this section, we show that
this type of arrangement promotes R&D by eliminating the ‘opportunistic
behavior’ on the part of the supplier. While the arguments are made in the
case of linear demand, it should be clear that the intuition carries over to
more general demand as well.
Under a fixed-price contract, the price level for the input is chosen first
and remains fixed forever. Given w, the downstream firms simultaneously
choose their R&D investment levels, yj. Given w and these R&D levels,
Cournot competition downstream yields the following quantity for firm Dj
(same as equation (6)):
qj =






The profit of Dj is then
πDj = (p − w − c + yj)qj = (qj)2 .
At the R&D stage, firm Dj maximizes π
D
j − γy2j , taking w as given. The
corresponding first order condition is
2n
(






The symmetric equilibrium R&D level is thus
y(w) =
a − c − w
γ(n + 1)2/n − 1 . (12)
As is to be expected, the downstream R&D level depends negatively on the
level of input price.
The total output corresponding to the symmetric R&D equilibrium is





γ(n + 1)2/n − 1 + 1
]
(a − c − w)
=
γ(n + 1)(a − c − w)
γ(n + 1)2/n − 1 .
Anticipating the relationship given by y(w), the upstream supplier chooses
an input price w to maximize its profit w ·Q(w). The solution to this problem
is
wf = (a − c)/2. (13)
Substituting this into equation (12), we get the equilibrium R&D level
under the fixed-price contract:
yf (n) ≡ y(wf ) =
1
2
· a − c
γ(n + 1)2/n − 1 .
It is then easily seen that yf (n) > y
∗(n) because 2n/(2n2 − 1) > 1/n.
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Proposition 3 Fixed-price contract by a upstream monopolist promotes down-
stream R&D, i.e., yf (n) > y
∗(n) for all n and γ ≥ 1.
Under the fixed-price contract, the upstream supplier commits not to
raise the input price after downstream firms conduct cost-reducing R&D.
This encourages R&D by the downstream producers by increasing the direct
benefits of innovation to those producers. Although the RRC incentive for
R&D (which is conducive to downstream innovation) is also eliminated, the
positive direct effect is so strong that the downstream producers end up
investing more in R&D under a fixed-price contract.
From equation (11), each downstream firm’s net profit under the fixed
price contract can be calculated to be






















γ(n + 1)2/n − 1
]2
. (14)
The profit of the upstream firm is






γ(n + 1)2/n − 1
]
. (15)
Can the R&D-stimulating fixed price contract be beneficial to all firms
including the upstream firm, relative to the case analyzed in Section 3? In-
tuitively, the downstream firms should be better off under a fixed contract
as the input price cannot increase after their R&D projects are completed.
There are two opposing effects at work for the upstream firm. First, firm U ’s
profit tends to go down as it cannot raise input price to take advantage of
the increased input demand. Second, because downstream producers invest
more in R&D and thus buy more of the input from it, the upstream sup-
plier’s profit tends to increase. The net effect on the upstream firm therefore
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depends on which of these two effects is stronger. Unfortunately, algebraic
complexity does not permit analytical results regarding the ranking of firm
profits under fixed contract (equations (14) and (15)) versus when the input
price can respond to downstream R&D (equations (9) and (10)). But nu-
merical simulations reveal that the second effect always dominates the first
so that fixed input price contract increases the profits of both the upstream
and the downstream firms.
Proposition 4 Assuming that the demand for the final product is linear and
the R&D cost function is γy2, a fixed price contract by an upstream monopoly
makes all firms better off for all n > 1 and γ ≥ 1.
Since industry output increases with the R&D level, consumers also ben-
efit with the increased innovation. Thus, the fixed-price contract analyzed
above improves social welfare as well.
5 Price Discrimination
In this section, we consider the case that the upstream monopolist is able
to charge each downstream producer a different price wj. The upstream
supplier enjoys the most freedom in adjusting the input price under price
discrimination—although it also has the flexibility to change the input price
under the floating price arrangement considered in Section 3, the input sup-
plier in that case must charge all its n customers a uniform price. We make
two points in this section. First, when the upstream supplier engages in
price discrimination, the RRC effect is absent. As a result, equilibrium R&D
monotonically decreases with the number of downstream firms, as is the case
in a horizontal R&D settings. Secondly, we show that the equilibrium R&D
level under price discrimination is even lower than that under the uniform
floating price arrangement. This, together with the result for fixed-price
16
contract, tells us that price flexibility by the upstream supplier discourages
downstream R&D.
Given the input price vector w = (w1,w2, ..., wn) and R&D investment
vector y = (y1, y2,..., yn), downstream Cournot output levels are
qj(w,y) =
a − (n + 1)(wj + c − yj) +
∑n
k=1(wk + c − yk)
n + 1
. (16)
Thus qj(w,y) is the derived demand for the input by firm Dj, which, as is
to be expected, depends on the cost conditions of its rival firms.
The upstream firm then chooses the vector of input prices w so as to
maximize
∑n
j=1 wj · qj(w,y). The first order conditions are
a − (n + 1)(wj + c − yj) +
∑n











a − c + (n + 1)yj −
∑n
k=1
yk − 2(n + 1)wj + 2
∑n
k=1
wk = 0. (17)








Substituting this into (17) yields the optimal prices for the upstream supplier:
wj =
a − c + yj
2
. (18)
Here downstream R&D by firm Dj raises its own input price only. The input
prices for other rival firms are independent of Dj’s R&D investment, and
consequently the RRC effect is not present under price discrimination.7





= − 1n+1 ,
for k = j. Thus, cost-reducing R&D by a downstream firm Dj increases its derived demand
for the input and decreases the derived demand for the input by all its rival firms. This
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Substituting the optimal input prices into the expressions for qj(w,y)
and after some simplification, we get
qj(y) =





The corresponding profit of firm Dj is thus
πDj =
[






At the R&D stage, firm Dj chooses yj to maximizes it profit π
D
j −γy2j yielding
the following first order condition:




· n = γyj




4γ(n + 1)2/n − 1 .
It can be easily seen that yd is smaller than y
∗ because n2/(2n2 − 1) < 1.
Combining this with the result in Proposition 3, we have:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium R&D level is highest under the fixed-price
contract and lowest under price discrimination, i.e., yd(n) < y
∗(n) < yf (n).
One can also compare the prices under the three scenarios we have con-
sidered. From equations (7), (13), (18) and the above proposition, we obtain
suggests that following R&D investment by Dj , the upstream monopoly will raise the
input price wj and lower all wk, j = k. However, if the upstream firm reduces input prices
for firms other than Dj , the derived demand by firm Dj declines, thus undermining the
effort of the U -firm to take advantage of Dj ’s increased demand for the input. In the linear
demand set-up, it turns out that the U -firm, in maximizing its overall profits, chooses not
to adjust other input prices in response to Dj ’s R&D.
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that the input price is the lowest under the fixed price contract and highest
under uniform pricing. The upstream firm charges the lowest input price
under the fixed contract because it cannot respond to the increase in the de-
mand for the input caused by downstream R&D. That input price is higher
under uniform pricing than under price discrimination is a direct consequence
of the fact that downstream firms invest more in R&D under uniform pricing,
leading to a higher demand for the input. Further, since aggregate output is
positively related to downstream R&D, we conclude from the above proposi-
tion that the price of the final product is lowest under the fixed price contract
and highest under price discrimination.
The question of how price discrimination by an upstream input supplier
affects downstream cost-reducing decisions was analyzed by DeGraba (1990).
DeGraba considers the case of a downstream duopoly and shows that the
downstream producers, who have two feasible technologies to choose from,
will select a technology with a higher marginal cost when the input supplier
price-discriminates than when it charges a uniform price. While DeGraba
was concerned with the welfare effects of price discrimination, we in this
section simply emphasize the point that additional freedom on the part of
the supplier’s price-setting behavior further reduces the R&D incentive of
the downstream producers by removing the RRC effect.
6 Conclusions
The insights from the analysis of R&D among firms in a vertical relationship
add considerably to those arising from the study of horizontal R&D alone
since the latter do not capture the interaction between the market tiers.
First, firms may only gain a relative cost advantage over their rivals under
horizontal R&D but with the introduction of the supplier-buyer relationship,
R&D by a firm may also raise their rivals’ absolute costs of production by
19
increasing the per-unit price they have to pay for it. Consequently, increased
downstream competition may lead to a greater investment in R&D down-
stream due to the increase in rivals’ cost. We show that this is likely to
occur when upstream firms have sufficient market power over the price of the
intermediate good.
Second, although it is optimal for the upstream supplier to raise the input
price post-R&D, such adjustment hampers the downstream firms’ incentive
to innovate in the first place. Reduced downstream R&D in turn hurts the
upstream supplier. We show that a long-term contract between the supplier
and the input buyers under which the input price is not allowed to change
as downstream firms innovate has the effect of promoting innovation and
benefiting firms at both levels of the market. Thus, fixed price contracts can
not only be a means of controlling production costs downstream, but can
also stimulate innovation downstream.
Our model with an upstream monopoly can be extended to one with an
oligopoly upstream. While it does not change the fact that downstream R&D
can increase the upstream input price by increasing the derived demand for
the input, having competition at the upstream level could change the degree
of the RRC effect. If there is enough competition among the input suppliers,
a given increase in the derived demand for the input may not translate into
a large increase in its price. We believe that the basic results continue to
hold in a model with an oligopoly upstream as long as the number of input
suppliers is not too big. Regarding the feasibility of a fixed-price contract,
a coordination problem may arise when there are more than one upstream
firms as to whether and how the input suppliers can fixe input prices. One
arrangement could be the overt collusion among the input suppliers. As
long as the suppliers can agree not to change input prices in response to
downstream R&D, price cartel agreements among the suppliers (which are
per se illegal under the antitrust laws) may potentially be welfare improving
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by encouraging downstream innovation.
One can also extend our analysis by adding R&D on the part of the
upstream firm as well. In such a situation, R&D activities by upstream and
downstream firms will be strategic complements and consequently increased
R&D investment downstream will induce the upstream firm to invest more
in R&D as well. We expect the basic results of our paper to hold in this
extended setting as well.
References
[1] d’Asprémont, C., Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative and nonocoopera-
tive R&D in duopoly with spillovers. American Economic Review 78,
1133-7.
[2] Banerjee, S. Lin, P., 2001. Vertical research joint ventures. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 285-302.
[3] DeGraba, P., 1990. Input Market Price Discrimination and the Choice
of Technology. American Economic Review 80, 1246-53.
[4] Inkmann, J., 1999. Horizontal and Vertical R&D Cooperation. Mimeo,
University of Konstanz.
[5] Klein, B., 1988. Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The
Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 4, 199-213.
[6] Lee, K.R., 1996. The Role of User Firms in the Innovation of Machine
Tools: The Japanese Case. Research Policy 25, 491-507.
[7] McLaren, J., 1999. Supplier Relations and the Market Context: A The-
ory of Handshakes. Journal of International Economics 48, 121-38.
21
[8] Ordover, J., Saloner, G., Salop, S.C., 1990. Equilibrium Vertical Fore-
closure. American Economic Review 80, 127-42.
[9] Reinganum, J., 1989. The Timing of Innovation: Research, Develop-
ment, and Diffusion. In: Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R. (Eds.), Hand-
book of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
849-908.
[10] Salinger, M., 1988. Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 77, 345-56.
[11] Salop, S.C., Scheffman, D., 1983. Raising Rivals’ Costs. American Eco-
nomic Review 73, 267-71.
[12] Stefanadis, C., 1997. Downstream Vertical Foreclosure and Upstream
Innovation. Journal of Industrial Economics 45, 445-56.
[13] Steurs, G., 1995. Inter-Industry R&D Spillovers: What Differences Do
They Make?. International Journal of Industrial Organization 13, 249-
76.
[14] Suzumura, K., 1992. Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an
Oligopoly with Spillovers. American Economic Review 82, 1307-20.
[15] Williamson, O., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications. Free Press, New York.
22
